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The suicide bomber lies outside the contingencies of religion and the 
promise of sex with 72 virgins. Instead, her desire lies squarely in the quest for 
inclusion in the field of vision and to count as a human being. This paper  
proposes an alternative critical discourse to the question of identity-based 
suffering and culpability. It aims to raise doubts about certain established notions 
concerning historical trauma that are thought to be singular, unrepeatable, and 
the result of fixed dichotomies. Instead, I wish to call for a rejection of the notion 
of competitive suffering and of culpability as limited to the group perpetrating the 
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Essay 
1 The Muslim at Auschwitz 
The Muselmann was described by Holocaust survivors as the Auschwitz 
prisoner who has given up and was given up by his comrades: “no longer had 
room in his consciousness for the contrasts good or bad, noble or base, 
intellectual or unintellectual ... He was a staggering corpse, a bundle of physical 
functions in its last convulsions” (Agamben, 41). 
In Remnants of Auschwitz, Giorgio Agamben characterizes the 
Muselmann as a stage that Auschwitz inmates reach when they are in such a 
state of physical decrepitude that other inmates would look at them almost as 
dead already. Agamben quotes Holocaust survivor and writer Primo Levi 
describing the Muselmann by saying, “One hesitates to call them living: one 
hesitates to call their death death” (44).  
 The Muselmann becomes the threshold between the states of life and 
death, but more importantly between the categories of human and inhuman. 
Deprived of all of dignity and moral compositions as human, there remains a faint 
biological connection between Muselmann and its species. Not a “living being” 
anymore, he is a walking corpse, non-human, living dead, and mummy-man 
(Agamben 54). To Agamben, the Muselmann “is the guard on the threshold of a 
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new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins where dignity ends” (69). He 
was cast outside the gaze; no one bears to look at him. In other words, he 
became a counter Medusa, who gazes at no one, but one who cannot be gazed 
at either. Before the Muselmann was cast into the gas chamber, he was already 
outside the gaze, “unbearable to the human eye” (Agamben 50). This inability to 
look at the Muselmann is not one of sympathy or abundance of compassion, but 
rather because he was unworthy of being looked at. The Muselmann was a 
source of anger and worry (Agamben 43).   
Primo Levi describes the Muselmann as “he who has seen the Gorgon.” 
According to Agamben, a Gorgon is a faceless “female head covered with 
serpents whose gaze produced death” (53). The Gorgon had no eyes and merely 
by looking at it, one would be killed.   
But where did the term Muselmann come from? How was it that the 
Muselmann became a separate being from his former self? Agamben clearly 
states that the word der Muselmann means Muslim, literally, and uses the two 
terms interchangeably (41). However, Agamben also explains that although there 
is little certainty about the origin of the term, it is evident that it was used at 
Auschwitz possibly as a reference to the image of a Muslim prostrating himself 
on the ground in prayer—all curled up with his face touching the ground. The 
word Muselmann may also be referring to the Muslims’ belief in submitting to the 
will of God and, as such, are seen as losing their will and surrendering to fate.  
Auschwitz inmates had to invent a new category for their Jewish identity 
as it began to descend into the state of non-human, an identity that does not 
resemble one’s original self, but one that is categorically different. Agamben 
notes, “It is certain, that with a kind of ferocious irony, the Jews knew that they 
would not die at Auschwitz as Jews” (45). In other words, the Jews who were 
targeted solely for their religious identity, in order to affirm the solidity of this 
identity, needed to invent an Other (The Muslim) to whom they can ascribe the 
degeneration of their own as they descend into the non-human state/stage of the 
Muselmann.  
The Jew, in that state, has become the Muslim. The Jew is stripped down 
to the remnant of his or her biological existence of the body as “bare life,” thus 
becoming not a Jew anymore but a Muselmann. One may wonder, why has the 
Muslim become the alterity of the Jewish inmates at Auschwitz? Has the Muslim, 
a descendant of Ishmael, not been the Jew’s brother all along? Both sons of 
Abraham, the father of all? Was Moses not an Egyptian?  
Could one consider this division of Jewish identity as the product of a 
“Western” perspective that has burdened itself with Otherness, once as 
perceived in the Jew, and a further Otherness as perceived in the Muslim? It is 
as if Othello was Shylock’s tormentor in the European fantasies of Otherness. 
Was Othello, a paranoid and violent man of war, meant to be the tragic 
counterpoint to Shylock’s comedy of greed?   
 
2 Jewish Kebab in Baghdad 
Where else do the Jew and the Arab meet? Don’t they meet in the person 
of the Arab Jew? Israeli scholar Ella Shohat, in “Reflections of an Arab Jew,” 
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excavates the figure of the Arab Jew, a term that to many in the West is seen 
more like a paradox. Shohat argues, however, that until the establishment of the 
state of Israel, the Arab Jew has been a fundamental part of the socio-economic, 
cultural, and even political life in many communities throughout the Middle East, 
and along with Arab Muslims and Arab Christians, developed through the 
centuries a common cultural identity that is imprinted with the sounds, sites, and 
aromas of the region.  
The life of the Jew as an Arab was richly, albeit romantically, described in 
Memories of Eden: A Journey through Jewish Baghdad, by Violette Shamash. 
She speaks tenderly of the luscious life she experienced as a young person 
within the vibrant Jewish community of Baghdadi Jews in Iraq before 1945. 
Shamash describes her life as “paradise” (19). She paints a tender, though 
idyllic, portrait of the city as seen from her family mansion on the banks of the 
Tigris characterized by the fragrance of walnut and apricot trees in the garden 
with kebabs being grilled on a tanoor oven. Shamash traces her Jewish 
community in Iraq back to Babylonian history as the home of “our patriarch 
Abraham” and the birthplace of the Talmud (95). 
In Baghdad, Yesterday: The Making of an Arab Jew, Sasson Somekh 
writes of his youth in Baghdad, describing details of the education he received in 
Arabic from a Shia cleric and how it started his interest in writing Arabic poetry as 
a teenager. Somekh’s memoir recounts his life as a writer involved in the political 
and cultural life of his Baghdad, meeting other writers in cafés on al-Rashid 
Street and sharing in the city’s vibrant cultural scene. As in Shamash’s story, 
Somekh also notes the role played by the rise of Zionism and Nazism as a strong 
factor in bringing out Jewishness as a marker of difference in the life of Iraqi 
Jews. He also unveils the complicit role of the Israeli, British, and Iraqi 
governments in facilitating the emigration of Iraqi Jews through secret 
agreements, false propaganda, local fascist gangs, and even terrorist operations 
by the Mossad in Iraq.  
In “Reflections by an Arab Jew,” Ella Shohat points out Israel’s systematic 
discrimination against Mizrahis (and Sephardic Jews in general) through state 
“institutions that deployed their energies and material to the consistent advantage 
of European Jews and to the consistent disadvantage of Oriental Jews.” 
Oriental Jews constitute 50% of Israel’s Jews, and when you add the 
indigenous Palestinian residents, Israelis who do not come from a European 
background total greater than 70% of the whole population. Nevertheless, 
Shohat notes that much of the cultural and educational systems in Israel were set 
without any consideration of the Oriental Jews’ identity and with only European 
Jews in mind: 
 
Stripped of our history, we have been forced by our no-exit situation to 
repress our collective nostalgia, at least within the public sphere. The 
pervasive notion of "one people" reunited in their ancient homeland 
actively disauthorizes any affectionate memory of life before Israel. We 
have never been allowed to mourn a trauma that the images of Iraq's 
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destruction only intensified and crystallized for some of us. (Shohat, 
“Reflections”) 
 
Arab Jews in Israel were made to learn a whole new history (of the 
European Jews) that was not necessarily their experience. Further betrayed by 
their language (they speak Arabic at home) and their own physiognomy, they are 
often mistaken for Palestinians and subsequently profiled as such and at times 
attacked by some or arrested for questioning by the authorities.  
Here, bio-politics perverts its way into the Jewish imagination one more 
time. As the European Jew, interned at Auschwitz, subjected to unthinkable 
trauma, began to degenerate physically into the Muselmann, here in the Jewish 
state, the Oriental Jew, likewise, lends his body to the Muslim, deprived of 
freedom, reduced to an inmate because here too, the Jew’s body is 
indistinguishable from that of an Arab. The eye that accuses the Palestinian also 
accuses his mimesis in the Oriental Jew.   
In her earlier work, “Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of 
Its Jewish Victims” (1988), Shohat explores in postcolonial terms the ways that 
Oriental Jews have been treated with prejudice by European Jews in Israel in 
ways reminiscent of the same colonialist and Orientalist terms that Europeans 
used with colonized nations, treating them as undercivilized, barbaric, and even 
sub-human. She contrasts the cultural and historical backgrounds of Arab Jews 
with European Jews, as representative of separate and uneven cultural domains. 
European Jews are the ones who imagined Zionism to solve the European 
problem of anti-Semitism and built the state of Israel in their own image. As such, 
they came to dominate the cultural, educational, and political discourse in the 
new state of Israel, and therefore, exercised the same Orientalist approach of 
Europeans towards Orientals in general. 
In “Sephardim in Israel,” Shohat notes that an “essential feature of 
colonialism is the distortion and even denial of the history of the colonized”(7). In 
this framework, she also explains that along the discriminatory propaganda of 
Israeli mainstream media, the Oriental Jew has been represented as backward, 
living in caves, unsuitable to modern life. Contrasted with that image, she posits, 
one should keep in mind the Metropolises from which many Oriental Jews came 
from: Alexandria, Baghdad, and Istanbul, which “were hardly the desolate 
backwaters without electricity or automobiles implied by the official Zionist 
account” (Shohat, “Sephardim” 7). She explains,  
 
Yet Sephardic and Palestinian children, in Israeli schools, are 
condemned to study a history of the world that privileges the 
achievements of the West, while effacing the civilizations of the 
East … The Zionist master-narrative has little place for either 
Palestinian or Sephardim, but while Palestinians possess a clear 
counter narrative, the Sephardic story is a fractured one embedded 




3 The Untestifiable Martyrdom of Thicklips 
In The Merchant of Venice, when Shylock had the opportunity to defend 
his outlandish ransom for a pound of flesh, his defense was to raise the humanity 
of the Jew as manifested in his corporeality, his biological composition, which he 
shares with all other human beings, Christians, and others:  
 
. . . … I am a Jew. Hath 
not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, 
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with 
the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject 
to the same diseases, healed by the same means, 
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as 
a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? 
if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison 
us, do we not die? (Act III, scene I) (Shakespeare, Merchant) 
 
Along the same line, and contrary to Shylock’s reasoning, the physical 
attributes of Othello (the other Venetian outsider) were repeatedly pointed at as 
signifiers not of semblance but of Otherness and alterity. In the play, Othello is 
described as “a Barbary horse” and “an old black ram.” He is referenced as 
“thicklips” and as having “the gross clasps of a lascivious Moor” (all Act 1, scene 
1) (Shakespeare, Othello).  
Unlike the European Jew, Othello’s physiognomy becomes a visible 
marker of difference and a disparaging sign of Otherness. Othello’s Otherness is 
all too visible. Therefore, Othello had to be abjected outside of vision. In that 
sense, Othello’s role as a soldier on behalf of the Venetian state is emphasized 
as the person whose place is supposed to die for others, and whose station is 
just one behind death. Othello the Moor, like the Muselmann, is viewed as non-
human, and one who is implicated in their own death in the form of self-sacrifice. 
 At the concentration camp, the Muselmann is visibly invisible. He is not 
dead, but seen as such. When he became Muselmann, the inmate crossed over 
to where he would not be counted as human any longer, but only as “bare life.” 
Agamben describes the Muselmann as the “untestifiable, that to which no one 
has borne witness” (Agamben 41).  
In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben quotes many survivors who wanted 
to stay alive specifically because they wanted to be a witness to the atrocities 
committed at the camp. What they have seen, although unsayable, must be told. 
In fact, survivors, like Primo Levi, have felt a constant compulsion to tell their 
story for a lifetime. But who testifies for that which no one bears to testify about? 
Indeed, at the beginning of the chapter “Witness,” Agamben quotes an 
Auschwitz prisoner asserting that he would not take his own life because he “did 
not want to suppress the witness that I could become” (15). Witness in this sense 
is probably taken in the narrow sense of seeing coupled with the functional sense 
of testifying. But we already know that there are parallels between the act of 
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witnessing and the act of martyrdom. The martyr as witness is a condition that 
intertwines the act of seeing with that of the witness’s certain death.  
In both Greek and Arabic, the word for martyr has direct ontological roots 
in the word for “witness”: “Martis” in Greek, “Shaheed” in Arabic. A “witness” is 
someone who has seen but who also bears the imperative of testifying to what 
was seen. A martyr, as witness, accepts that his or her testimony will lead to their 
death, and as such, could be seen as implicated in his or her own self-sacrifice 
through the ‘act’ of testifying. The Bible refers to the act of witnessing as both 
following Christ as well as witnessing the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus.  
Martyrdom, then, could be described as the act of willingly getting involved 
in a physical situation where the martyr knows that by advocating certain 
principles (testifying to what he or she believes is “truth”), the martyr will be giving 
up his or her life. In other words, by knowing fully and well in advance that his or 
her testimony will lead to death, the martyr is implicated in his or her own 
sacrifice through the act of testifying.  
The emphasis that I’d like to make here is on the apparent oppositions 
that one may find along the states of living, witnessing, and martyrdom. These 
states seem to resolve around the fourth state of action—since which state a 
person may end up in crucially depends on the action (or non-action) chosen. I 
argue that there is an inherent split in the notion of martyrdom between testifying 
and sacrifice and that at the core of this split has been the question of action.  
The martyr is a person who has decided to sacrifice his or her own life so 
others could live, and one who has given up his or her dignity so that others may 
have dignity. In a way, a martyr, like a hero, is a description given by the 
beneficiaries of the martyr’s actions to those who willingly give up their own lives 
with the hope that others will not have to.  
A martyr’s testimony is delivered not in the narrow sense of a verbal 
witness but in the corporeal sense of delivering one’s body as evidence. As such, 
the Muselmann’s position at the concentration camp pushed to the thresholds of 
the non-living could be contrasted by that other Arab/Muslim at that other camp, 
the refugee camp. The Arab at the Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza and the 
West Bank casts a different kind of gaze to his own predicament and locates his 
own body as a site of action and resistance.  
  
4 But Whose Blood is it, Anyway? 
Primo Levi, the Auschwitz witness par excellence, less than 40 years after 
his release, found himself confronted with the moral obligation to speak in 
support of residents of another camp: the Palestinian refugee camps.  
Commenting on the aftermath of the massacre of civilians at the Palestinian 
refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, Levi located the Jew in the Muslim, once more. He wrote: “Everybody 
is somebody’s Jew. And today the Palestinians are the Jews of the Israelis” (qtd. 
in Butler “Primo”). 
In her biography of Levi entitled Primo Levi: Bridges of Knowledge (1995), 
Mirna Cicioni underlines Levi’s moral obligation as a witness to Auschwitz in the 
making of such a clear and direct connection. She says that Levi “implicitly 
7 
 
acknowledged that he was being asked to speak as an Auschwitz survivor as 
well as an internationally famous writer and agreed to do so to counteract the 
ideological use of the Holocaust by the Israeli ruling class as a justification of its 
attempt to wipe out the Palestinian people” (Cicioni 129). Cicioni quotes Levi as 
saying in an interview to the Italian newspaper La Republica:  
 
I am torn apart, also because I know very well that Israel was 
founded by people like me, who were less lucky than I was. Men 
with the Auschwitz number tattooed on their arms, homeless and 
countryless ... who found a home and a country over there. I know 
all this. But I also know that this is Begin’s argument. And I do not 
recognise this argument as valid. (Cicioni 128-129)  
 
  On the other hand, Judith Butler, in “Primo Levi for the Present” (2006) 
marks Levi’s clear and unequivocal moral objection to the insturmentalization of 
the Shoah to legitimize violence. Butler quotes Levi answer to a newspaper 
interviewer’s question about whether he could see all the Jewish blood spilled in 
all these years, as saying: “I reply that the blood spilled pains me just as much as 
the blood spilled by all other human beings.” 
In the refugee camp, however, a new form of homo sacer is born, one who 
recognizes her own bio-power and who turns her own body, already a non-living 
bare life, a zero level of humanity, into a resurrection of the notion of sacrifice. 
This refugee understands such a state too well and becomes intent on 
threatening death itself instead of being the object of the threat of death by 
others. 
The suicide bomber has witnessed her/his own inescapable state as homo 
sacer and realizes fully that her misery is outside the field of vision. Unable to 
sustain a life that does not recognize her humanity, she seems committed to 
answering a question asked by Shylock centuries ago. In a very simplistic 
perspective, one can see that a suicide bomber’s action is cruel and insane that 
merely proves that both the Jew and the Palestinian bleed when you prick them 
and when you poison them they both die. By foregrounding the body, the suicide 
bomber violently and relentlessly attempts to suture the unnatural slit between 
the Jew and the Arab.  
It is evidently naïve to fantasize about the suicide bomber as merely a 
religious fanatic duped with the promise of sex with 72 virgins. One would notice 
that the wave of suicide bombers in the Middle East started in 1985 when an 
attractive 18-year-old Lebanese sales clerk who works at a video store and a 
member of the secular Syrian Nationalist Party, Sana Mhaidali, drove a white 
Peugeot laden with explosives into an Israeli army convoy in Southern Lebanon. 
Mhaidali recorded a video message in which she appeared in military uniform, 
introduced herself by saying: “I am martyr Sana Mhaidali, I am 18 years old” and 
then went on to address her family and her countrymen to explain the patriotic 
reasons that drove her to become a human bomb. The specificity of video as the 
medium of her last testimony was meant as an eye opener, a dislocation of vision 
to the plight of a people who have been for years under foreign occupation. 
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Initial news reports, unable to comprehend Mhaidali’s motivation, claimed 
that she was pregnant and wanted to hide her shame, or that she was severely 
depressed. Neither was true. Indeed, many who studied female suicide bombers 
have looked for uniquely female contingencies that would drive women to die: too 
young, psychologically disturbed, under male influence, revenge seeking, etc., 
only to find no single consistent explanation. According to Lindsey O’Rourke’s 
August 2008 article in The New York Times, “There is precious little evidence of 
uniquely feminine motivations driving women’s attacks.”  
In Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How 
to Stop It (2010), Robert Pape and James Feldman present the outcome of their 
work at Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism. The report studied over 
2,200 suicide attacks across the world for a period of about 30 years. Its findings 
categorically reject the association of religious fundamentalism as the key 
motivator of suicide bombers. The researchers found that 95% of all suicide 
attacks were carried out in response to foreign occupation, citing that 90% of 
worldwide attacks are anti-American in areas occupied by the U.S. and that there 
was a drop of 90% in suicide bombing in Israel after Israel’s withdrawal from 
Gaza and large parts of the West bank (Pape and Feldman 240).  
Pape and Feldman explain that the suicide bomber phenomenon is 
determined by two factors: first is perceived cultural difference between occupier 
and occupied (49) (which they narrowly define as religious), and the second is 
the existing of other forms of resistance prior to the appearance of suicide 
bombing. In that sense, suicide bombing becomes a weapon of last resort, when 
other attempts at resistance have failed (Pape and Feldman 24).  
When Pape and Feldman look at the ensuing environment after the 
September 11 attacks, they note the emergence of a grand American narrative 
on terror that surfaced after the terrorist attacks. Since the 9/11 hijackers were all 
Muslims, it was easy to presume that Islamic fundamentalism was the central 
motivating force driving the 19 hijackers to kill themselves—in order to kill us. 
Within weeks after the attack, surveys of American attitudes show that this 
presumption was fast congealing into a hard reality in the public mind. Americans 
immediately wondered, ‘Why do they hate us?’ and many quickly came to the 
conclusion that it was because of who we are, our identity, and not what we do, 
our actions (Pape and Feldman 320). 
The media generally followed with a concerted representation of 
“Fundamentalist Islam” as a staunch adversary of “Western” culture and 
supporter of terrorism against the American “way of life.” The goal of forcible or at 
best interventionist transformation of Arab societies into Western democracies 
was advocated by political strategists like Richard Perle and David Frum in An 
End to Evil (2003) and Paul Wolfowitz and, among many, columnist by Fareed 
Zakaria, who wrote an article in Newsweek in which he stated, “The United 
States must help Islam enter the modern world.” One would note that even in the 
case of Zakaria, who did not explicitly call for the use of military force, he still 
refers to “Islam,” a religion, as the object of a U.S. intervention.  
According to this narrative, the Muslims’ lack of democracy and 
oppositional stand against “Western civilization” was a satisfactory (albeit 
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summary and quick) explanation for the motivations that drove the 9/11 terrorists. 
Therefore, it was “understandable” that America needed to strike back at al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, as it is currently “understandable” to place 
the whole American Muslim community on trial through the Congressional 
Commission on Radical Islam, chaired by Representative Peter King. The 
Commission aims to have the American Muslim communities “prove” that U.S. 
Muslims are not radicalized and that they are willing to cooperate with security 
forces. The underlying message one receives clearly is that a defense is 
necessary because Muslim communities are radicalized and non-cooperative. 
 
5 Smoke, Dreams, and Psychotherapy 
It is quite telling that when a terrorist attack is conducted by a Muslim, 
automatically all focus is poured on the attacker’s religious motivations and his 
deep hatred for America. A case in point is that of Faisal Shahzad, dubbed the 
Times Square bomber, who in court made multiple religiously infused statements 
that referred to his actions as being in defense of his “people.”   
Jared Lee Loughner, on the other hand, is the Tucson, Arizona, resident 
who launched a massacre, killing six people and injuring sixteen on January 8, 
2011. Unlike the surety and finality that seems to have been rendered in 
Shahzad’s motivations, reviewers of Loughner’s action seem more perplexed by 
Loughner’s motivations and psychological conditions. The various media 
representations of Loughner were not only one of shock and disbelief but also 
(because of this incredulity) almost imbued with an air of veiled exoneration as 
detected in the insistence of reviewers to dig deeply into Loughner’s biography, 
his relationship with schoolmates, his recent work, his library visits, his marijuana 
use, smoking, etc. We see interviews of Loughner’s family distraught at his 
terrible actions and begin to question if it is possible that one of “us” could have 
done this terrible crime against us. It was not one of “them” this time. Therefore, 
something must be wrong in what we perceive and not in the action itself. 
Loughner was eventually described as a delusional paranoid and ordered by the 
court to undergo psychological examination.  
One wonders why the terrorist who happens to be a Muslim is considered 
without history, no friends, no family, no psychological background, no marijuana. 
Why is it that we find it quite easy to simplify the Muslim and accept his 
“fundamentalism” as his singular proof of culpability?  
Major Nidal Hassan, a Virginia native and army psychiatrist, on November 
19, 2009, just one day before his deployment to Afghanistan, went on a shooting 
rampage at the Soldier Readiness Center of Fort Hood, Texas, killing thirteen 
people and wounding thirty. Hassan’s coverage in the media was limited to 
references to his Palestinian ancestry, his Islamic religious beliefs, and an 
underachieving career as a psychiatrist. Again, no family photo albums, no 
personal history, no marijuana. It is as if the Muslim terrorist not only has seen 
the Gorgon but has also become the faceless Gorgon itself, that which cannot be 
looked at, but is understood to be the source of terror.  
Could Nidal Hassan be seen as an echo of Frantz Fanon, a 
psychoanalyst, born in the French colony of Martinique, French educated, and in 
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the service of the colonizing French army in Algeria? One wonders about the 
psychological and intellectual traversal that went through Fanon, already a 
colonial soldier fighting those with similar skin tone who are colonized like him. 
Fanon crosses to the other side, as the head of a psychiatric hospital in Algeria, 
but only to eventually join the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In The 
Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha notes that Fanon “discovered the impossibility 
of his mission as a colonial psychiatrist” (58). Bhabha quotes Fanon: “If 
psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be a 
stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, 
permanently an alien in his own country, lives in a state of absolute 
depersonalization” … (58). 
Fanon had maintained that since colonialism was built and sustained with 
violence, it could be destroyed only by violence. But violence reveals its face in 
multiple ways. In Welcome to the Desert of the Real, Slavoj Zizek points out that 
the Real in its extreme violence is “the price to be paid for peeling off the 
deceptive layers of reality” (5-6). One can understand Zizek’s statement as an 
unveiling of a capitalist structure, which camouflages systems of exploitation and 
dehumanization under media images of happy consumerism and hyperreal 
modes of economic and social existence.  
Western narcissism may have caused many to believe that Western 
civilization is not only the object of terrorism but also its sole subject; not only that 
the U.S. faces the dangers of terrorism today, but that terrorism did not materially 
exist before September 11. Such disconnect from history fails to note that many 
“liberation movements” in the world as late as the 1970s had adopted violence as 
the means to effect social change. These groups had similar ideological agendas 
but still operated with local focus. They included the Baadr-Meinhof gang in 
Germany, the Red Brigade in Italy, ETA in Spain, the IRA in Ireland, the PLO in 
Palestine, and the Japanese Red Army. 
Zizek relates the birth of such groups to the failure of European student 
movements of the late sixties that demonstrated:  
 
that the masses were so deeply immersed in their apolitical 
consumerist stance that it was not possible to awaken them 
through standard political education and consciousness-raising - a 
more violent intervention was needed to shake them out of their 
ideological numbness, their hypnotic consumerist state, and only 
direct violent interventions like bombing supermarkets would do the 
job. (Zizek 9) 
 
Zizek claims that “the same holds, on a different level, for today’s 
fundamentalist terror?” He asks: “Is not its goal also to awaken us, Western 
citizens, from our numbness, from immersion in our - everyday ideological 
universe?” (Zizek 9) 
Zizek finds that violence, delivered by so-called “fundamentalist terrorists,” 
to be a revelatory act that aims at penetrating through the spectacularrity of 
everyday social reality. This revelatory act reveals a “passion for the Real” that 
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we are not supposed to experience directly—almost like the face of the Gorgon. 
What we experience in our everyday life is a virtual reality, he posits. It is a reality 
without its substance. Zizek says, “… just as decaffeinated coffee smells and 
tastes like real coffee without being real coffee, Virtual Reality is experienced as 
reality without being so. What happens at the end of this process of 
virtualization?” (16) In that sense, one’s experience of coffee is no longer directly 
related to coffee itself but to what one is told (by the media, marketing systems, 
etc.) is expected to be coffee, or coffee as it “should” be. It is where an “idea” sits 
in and replaces something else, and as such, alters and completes one’s 
experience. In the short story, The Exactitude of Science, Borges imagines an 
empire where a full-scale map was devised and eventually replaced the actual 
geography of the country. Our experience of the map becomes a replacement 
and substitution for the geographical experience of the country itself. In the same 
way, our experience of “fake” coffee is quite inconsequential, because it is 
dependent on what we are told is standing for “the ideal” of coffee 
(notwithstanding that decaffeinated coffee, from Zizek’s example, is still coffee, 
but one that has been processed to remove from it what is undesirable).  
Observing the spectacular nature of the attack on the World Trade Center, 
Zizek notes that the video footage of the attack has the characteristics of the 
effects of a Hollywood catastrophe movie. In a way, he posits, it felt like a 
catastrophe movie that we could have watched before. He finds that we were 
experiencing this “real reality” as a “virtual entity.” Zizek refers to the compulsion 
to repeatedly watch images of the collapse of the Twin Towers as “jouissance at 
its purest” (12). However, he also points to the all revealing realization that “It 
was when we watched the two WTC towers collapsing on the TV screen, that it 
became possible to experience the falsity of TV shows'” (Zizek 11)—a point 
similarly raised by Baudrillard in the “Violence of the Image.”  
Zizek notes the surprising lack of TV images of the actual carnage at the 
WTC collapse: “—no dismembered bodies, no blood, no desperate faces of 
dying people” (13). He contrasts these images with “reporting on Third World 
catastrophes, where the whole point is to produce a scoop of some gruesome 
detail: Somalis dying of hunger, raped Bosnian men with their throats cut” (Zizek 
13). 
The repackaging of reality, Zizek finds out, is intended to control the 
piercing of the Real that was done by the terrorist attacks. This kind of 
representation is proof that even in this moment of trauma, there exists a 
distance between us and them, that “the real horror happens there not here.” He 
says: “Again, the ultimate truth of the capitalist utilitarian despiritualized universe 
is the dematerialization of 'real life' itself, its reversal into a spectral show” (Zizek 
13). The insistence on distanciation between the contemporary Western citizen 
and the experience of historical trauma is felt clearly in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina when the use of the word “refugees” in the media to describe the 
displaced population of New Orleans was seen as an insult. President Bush was 
quoted as saying, "The people we're talking about are not refugees. They’re 
Americans.” Jesse Jackson went even further to say, “It is racist to call American 
citizens refugees” (MSNBC). 
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Zizek completely inverts this concept of distanciation between historical 
trauma and the Western psyche, and locates events like September 11 in “the 
twisted logic of dreams.” He says that, 
 
it was before the WTC collapse that we lived in our reality, 
perceiving Third World horrors as something which was not actually 
part of our social reality, as something which existed (for us) as a 
spectral apparition on the (TV) screen - and what happened on 
September 11 was that this fantasmatic screen apparition entered 
our reality. It is not that reality entered our image: the image 
entered and shattered our reality… . (Zizek 16) 
 
If we were to go back to Shylock’s assertion of sharing a common 
physiognomy with the European and the appropriation of this perspective by the 
terrorist for an emphatic reversal/demonstration of its truthfulness, we will find 
that what Zizek shows are layers of the Real and of dreams where our realities 
as humans are not simply exchanged as fantasies but also experienced as 
nightmarish visions of catastrophe.  
Zizek tells a story in “The Smell of Love” about a famous Jewish ballerina 
who was asked to dance by the concentration camp officers “as a gesture of 
special humiliation.” As she started to dance and was able to capture the officers’ 
attention, Zizek says “she quickly grabbed the machine-gun from one of the 
distracted guards, and before being shot down herself, succeeded in killing more 
than a dozen officers” (142-143). 
The above story, even if accurate, certainly belongs in the realm of fantasy 
and dreams. Zizek uses it as illustration of an “act” that undermines the “servicing 
of goods,” one that interrupts the “reign of the pleasure-reality principle” (142). He 
finds that one could find another example of taking such an act in the passengers 
of the hijacked UA Flight 93 over Pennsylvania taking over the plane to prevent 
the killing of others even though this act will cost them their lives. This act, similar 
to the ballerina’s act, may be viewed as part of a chain or relations in which both 
the passengers and hijackers are a part: An act of violence that will lead to their 
own sacrifice, and a nightmarish state of total destruction and mutual collapse.  
What is evident is that the assertion of life has to be based on the 
recognition that life, all life, is precarious, and as such, precious, as posited by 
Judith Butler in Precarious Life (2004) and Frames of War (2009). If the killing of 
any person is tantamount to the killing of all mankind, as quoted in the Quran, 
and if spilled blood, any person’s blood, pains us, as stated by Primo Levi, it 
becomes necessary then to locate violence, any violence, as it violates life, as 
egregious and a source of terror. 
Butler suggests that “specific lives cannot be apprehended as injured or 
lost if they are not first apprehended as living. If certain lives do not qualify as 
lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological 
frames, these lives are never lived nor lost in the full sense” (Frames 1). 
This intelligibility of life could be seen in the Muselmann and in the 
refugee, in the news story that allocates a half front page for a white man 
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kidnapped in Colombia and a small third page column for dozens of Africans 
killed by civil war or by a natural disaster.1 To understand these differentiations, 
Butler asks us to understand how meaning is constructed as the result of 
epistemological frames. Frames of war “are selective in carving up experiences 
that are essential to the war” (Butler, Frames 26). But by extending this notion to 
the questions of violence and the apprehension of life, one is confronted with the 
frame being extended to include all kinds of modes and manifestations of 
violence and counter violence. 
It is necessary that one be aware of the essentialist nature of terms like 
terrorist, Muslim, Arab, Westerner, etc. since it is impossible to encompass all 
those who are referred to by these terms. Naturally, one can speak of Muslim 
terrorists, Tamil terrorists, and Basque terrorists, etc. But even Muslim terrorists 
may not necessarily be Arab or fundamentalist. They could be communist, 
secular, etc. As we have seen in the field work of Pape and Feldman, Lindsey 
O’Rourke, and others, it is not only problematic to theorize the suicide bomber, it 
is likewise difficult to categorize her or him. The temptation to find a unitary 
explanation that would blanket—cover all possible motivations is blatantly naïve 
and clearly futile. Terrorists could be motivated by a desire to sacrifice one’s self 
so that others may benefit (at times even monetarily), or it could be that their 
motivation lies in hatred, fanaticism, ignorance, poverty, vengeance, idealism, 
etc. Attempts to categorize “terrorists” or “suicide bombers” under a single of 
classification or another could, therefore, merely function as a self-defeating 
generalization. As one theorizes the concept of suicide bombing, one should not 
ignore the fact that the instrument of terrorism, specular violence, is itself 
universal in its effect and in its experience, which is, in some ways, both the irony 
and the genius of the suicide bomber.  
On the other hand, why could not the concept of violence, although multi-
modal, also be viewed as a universal notion: The poison that kills the Jew is the 
same poison that kills the Arab? Butler emphasizes: “Precarity cuts across 
identity categories as well as multicultural maps, thus forming the basis for an 
alliance focused on opposition to violence and its capacity to produce, exploit, 
and distribute precarity for the purpose of profit and territorial defense” (Frames 
32). Butler, here, calls for a perspective that is capable of seeing that the 
application of (political) violence leads to the same results regardless of what is 
the cultural identity of its victim. The same could also be said about the cultural 
identity of the perpetrator.  
In suffering and in aggression, there are commonalities, as well as there 
are commonalities between suffering and aggression. Beyond the intricacies of 
identity lie the precarity of life and the mutuality of culpability. The notions of 
victim and executioner are essential links in a Hegelian “long chain of 
conjunction,” where “Victim and executioner are equally ignoble”2 (Agamben 17). 
These notions are imbedded in the public imagination and, as part of the official 
narrative, are not immune to subversion. When Derrida received the Theodor 
Adorno award, on September 22, 2001, he commented on the attacks of 
September 11 by saying: “My unconditional compassion, addressed at the 
victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying aloud: with regard to 
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this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless” (qtd. in Zizek 17). It 
is not only that Zizek’s observation rings true: “ultimately, we are all Homo sacer” 
(100), but one needs to most decidedly keep in mind the constant complexity 
discovered at Auschwitz that “No group was more human than any other. . . the 
lesson of the camps is brotherhood in abjection” (Agamben 17).3 
 The realization that suffering is universal and that an instrumentalization 
that could exploit someone (or some group’s) suffering in order to victimize 
others is a secondary victimization of the original victim because this 
instrumentalization becomes as disavowal of the meaning of suffering. Therefore, 
one could assert that the singularization of one’s suffering as unique and 
unrepeatable could also as a repudiation of those who have suffered but belong 
to a different category. The project relentlessly proposed by Mahatma Gandhi in 
1930 as a form of resistance still rings true and strong. Gandhi’s foregrounding of 
the body, one’s own, as a site of both sacrifice and public peril stands in contrast 
to an endless chain of victims and violators, who both deploy and assail the 
human body. In the same spirit, one notes that the current movements for 
freedom and democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere have decidedly 
moved away from violence, while at the same time did so through the position of 
being physically present in public at the peril of the violence of the state, the 




1 One should note that there are indeed few examples where events 
“overseas” are covered by the U.S. mainstream media that do not include 
an American getting murdered in Aruba or getting accused of murder in 
Italy. However, even in the Chilean miners’ story, one is confronted by an 
ending that brings an American hero as the ultimate savior who manages 
to devise the impossible, but technically ingenious solution, to the miners’ 
problem. 
 
2 Agamben quoting Wolfgang Sofsky in The Order of Terror: The 
Concentration Camps. (1997): Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of 
Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. New York: Zone Books, 1999, 
17. 
 
3 Agamben quoting Wolfgang Sofsky in The Order of Terror: The 
Concentration Camps. (1997): Agamben, Giorgio. Remnants of 
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